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There has been much study of the consequences of economic freedom
but, outside of the role of political institutions, there has been little study
of the determinants of economic freedom. We investigate whether reli-
gion affects economic freedom. Our cross-sectional data set includes 137
countries averaged over the period 2001–2010. Simple correlations show
that Protestantism is associated with economic freedom, Islam is not, with
Catholicism in between. The Protestant ethic requires economic free-
dom. Our empirical estimates, which include religiosity, political institu-
tions, and other explanatory variables, confirm that Protestantism is most
conducive to economic freedom.
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The benefits of economic freedom have been widely documented.1 If eco-
nomic freedom is beneficial, what determines the economic freedom that a
population has? We expect economic freedom to be associated with democ-
racy or political freedom.2 In low-income countries, authoritarian rulers and
supportive elites have reason to deny economic freedom to preempt emer-
gence of a middle class that would threaten regime security by seeking
accountability from government and democracy. The concern of the author-
itarian ruler and supportive elites may also be that personal wealth made
possible by economic freedom will be used to contest the privileges and
rents available through control of authoritarian government.3
We investigate whether economic freedom can be explained by religion
independently of political institutions. We consider three religions—
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam—with origins in Judaism. The prin-
ciples of Jewish law emphasize ethical behavior in market transactions and
also particularly with regard to charity (Tamari 1993, 1996). Wealth in
biblical times was viewed as due to good fortune through birth and, because
of uncertainties in agricultural societies, as involving the weather and trans-
porting goods and animals. The obligation under Jewish law to act with
charity toward those to whom fate has been unkind was included in the
doctrines of the Christian Church and Islam.4 Protestantism has, however,
taken a contrary position in emphasizing productiveness through personal
effort rather than charity. Judaism also has a concept of ‘‘correcting the
world’’ through personal endeavor. Luther viewed Protestantism as close
enough to Judaism to invite the Jews to join him in his reformed religion
(the Jews declined).
Protestantism initiated by Luther rejected the claim that souls of the
deceased could be trapped in Purgatory between Heaven and Hell and
would go to Hell if not released to Heaven for an appropriate payment to
the Catholic Church. Such payment was regarded as akin to extortion from
living relatives. The basis for extortion was ended through the doctrine of
predetermination. If a person’s fate in the afterlife was predetermined at
birth, salvation could not be influenced by payments to the Church or by
any other means. An essential conservatism associated with Lutheran doc-
trine maintained that people were to be content with their station in life and
should not attempt to progress or consume beyond their place in the society.
Predetermination had unfortunate psychological consequences. People
were subject to anxiety because of the uncertainty about whether they
were predestined for Heaven or Hell. The psychological restart offered
by the Catholic Church through confession to a priest was not available.
Protestantism perceived of no need for another man to be an intermediary
250 Public Finance Review 46(2)
between a person and God. The solution to the anxiety about whether a
person was predestined for Heaven or Hell was given by Zwingli and Calvin
and other Protestant reformers, who proposed that believers were obliged to
believe that they were among the chosen who would to be saved. Work was
pleasing to God and tamed worldly desires. The people who believed them-
selves to be chosen should therefore devote themselves to productive work
even if they were already rich. Weber ([1904] 1958) formulated the concept
of the Protestant ethic against the background of certainty in salvation being
revealed by being the instrument of God in being productive and creating
profits and wealth.
Success in revealing salvation according to the principles of the Protes-
tant ethic requires economic freedom to satisfy a deep emotional need.5
People who need to substantiate their belief that they are chosen for salva-
tion will not wish their government to deny them the economic freedom that
they require for the productive work that reveals their salvation. Catholi-
cism does not have the same emotional need for economic freedom: salva-
tion comes through belief and the slate of sins can always be wiped clean
through confession and repentance. The prediction is therefore that Protes-
tantism is more conducive to economic freedom than Catholicism because
of the emotional need under Protestantism for economic freedom to verify
being among the chosen for salvation.
There are, however, qualifications. With work in itself the key to self-
substantiation of having been chosen for salvation, people will work inde-
pendently of personal reward. Protestantism is therefore consistent with a
welfare state that offers little monetary incentive for personal effort based
on personal reward but regards as damned someone who does not work and
relies on the welfare state to survive. The question is therefore open as to
whether a Protestant population is necessarily associated with greater eco-
nomic freedom. Different answers are suggested depending on the influence
of the doctrine of Luther or other forms of Protestantism that have origins in
Zwingli and Calvin.
Kuran (1997, 2004, 2010) has described the impediments to economic
freedom under Islam. Rule under Islam has been authoritarian with usually
an emphasis on the wealth of the ruler and his tribe rather than the welfare of
the general population. Protection of private property rights has been lim-
ited, leading to a phenomenon of people hiding their wealth and also men
hiding their women.6 The institution of a waqf or trust with a designated
religious objective has been a traditional means of protecting wealth from
appropriation under Islam, but reallocation of resources has been con-
strained by the complexity of redefining the objectives permissible to the
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waqf when needs and opportunities change. Islam has also retained a con-
servative view of the prohibition on interest. The original Jewish biblical
prohibition on interest had a social–justice motivation: people who had
fallen on hard times and needed to borrow to survive should not be addi-
tionally burdened by payment of interest. The borrowing was for consump-
tion until self-reliance could be restored. Interest payments involving
investment and trade were matters that could be accommodated through
risk- and profit-sharing arrangements. Christianity initially took the interest
prohibition literally.7 Whereas Christianity has changed from the original
interpretation of a prohibition on interest, Islam has not.8
Where Islam is strictly adhered to, women may be denied access to labor
markets or may be required to work only where other workers are also
female, because of prohibitions on contact with males from outside the
family, including being in the unchaperoned presence of nonfamily males.
Dress requirements of Islam for women are not consistent with all forms of
employment. In contrast, the economic benefits of Protestantism have been
proposed to be associated with the requirement of literacy for individual
study of the bible including literacy for girls and women.9
The supreme values of Islam contradict economic freedom. The lexico-
graphic ordering of objectives requires first achieving the high-priority
goals of spreading Islam and liberation of land that was once in the domain
of Islam before seeking material objectives. There is, therefore, a religious
need to disallow economic freedom to compel a focus on confronting non-
believers and acquiring wealth and property, and women, through conquest
See Bernholz (1995) and Hillman (2007b).
The prediction for our study is therefore that Islam is associated with low
economic freedom.10 Authoritarian government, however, diminishes eco-
nomic freedom and Muslim-majority countries tend to be autocratic.11
Religion may be nominal only and differ from the actual practice of
religion or religiosity. Our data show religiosity to be high in Muslim-
majority countries. Islam therefore provides a direct contemporary con-
nection between religion and economic freedom. In Europe, in particular,
Protestant and Catholic religiosity are low. In the Scandinavian countries
and also elsewhere in secular but nominally Christian countries, the state
has replaced religion and reliance on God as the protector of life and
security.12 Where religiosity is low, the relation between religion and
economic freedom reflects intertemporal transmission of priors of past
religious belief. Such intergenerational transmission has been found his-
torically in other connections between past and more contemporary
behavior.13
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Our data, which are cross-sectional for 137 countries averaged over the
period 2001–2010, show correlations between economic freedom and reli-
gion indicating that Protestantism is conducive to economic freedom, Islam
is not, and Catholicism is somewhere in between. Economic freedom is
positively associated with Protestantism (r¼ .27) and negatively associated
with Islam (r ¼ .21). For Catholicism, the correlation is close to 0 (r ¼
.06). The correlation coefficient between the economic freedom index and
religiosity is .48, indicating that, on average, where religiosity is high,
economic freedom is low.
Our empirical estimates confirm that high economic freedom is
explained by the presence of Protestant populations. Results for Catholi-
cism tend to be insignificant. There are indications in the results that Islam
is inimical to economic freedom. Democracy is, as expected, conducive to
economic freedom and autocracy is not.
The primary conclusion from our empirical results supports Max
Weber’s claim of a Protestant ethic. Historically and traditionally, the
emotional need of Protestantism to overcome the anxiety of personal
uncertainty regarding predetermination required economic freedom. Even
if religiosity in contemporary Protestant populations is low, the legacy of
the Protestant ethic is economic freedom for individuals to be conscien-
tiously productive. Taxes and the conditionality of income transfers, on
the other hand, diminish economic freedom. Our empirical results using
Scandinavian legal origin as an explanatory variable confirm that the
presence of the conditions of the Scandinavian welfare state diminishes
economic freedom.14
Data
Economic Freedom Indices
Tomeasure economic freedom, we use the Economic Freedom of theWorld
(EFW) index by Gwartney et al. (2014). The EFW index by Gwartney et al.
(2014) is available for 152 countries over the period 1970–2011. For the
period 1970–2000, there are data available every fifth year (1970, 1975,
1980, . . . ); from 2000, annual data have been available. Economic freedom
is measured in five broad areas: size of government (expenditures, taxes,
and enterprises), legal structure and security of property rights, access to
sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of labor,
credit, and business. The economic freedom indices take on values between
0 (minimum economic freedom) and 10 (maximum economic freedom).
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We use the average of the economic freedom indicators over the period
2001–2010. To avoid transient changes, we do not use the economic free-
dom indices in individual years. We estimate a cross-sectional model
because the data on religion do not vary over time.
Religious Groupings and Religiosity
We use the data on religious groupings from Parker (1997). This database
reports for each country the percentage of the population adhering to the
most widespread world religions. The data are estimates based on different
sources compiled in the calendar year 1994. Countries with a large share of
Catholics in the population, for example, include Malta (97 percent), Para-
guay (96 percent), and Spain (95 percent). The average Catholic share in the
overall sample is 31.40 percent. Countries with a high share of Protestants
include, for example, Estonia (100 percent) and Iceland (96 percent). The
average Protestant share in the sample is 13.73 percent. With some few
exceptions, countries with Muslim majorities do not accommodate signif-
icant non-Muslim minorities. Countries with Muslim majorities include
Yemen (100 percent), Algeria (99 percent), Mauretania (99 percent), and
Morocco (99 percent). The average Muslim share in the sample is 21.45
percent. Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam account for 66.58 percent of
the total world population in our data. We place other religions in a residual
‘‘others’’ category.
For religiosity, we use the variable of Berggren and Bjørnskov (2013)
based on the Gallup World View question about importance of religion.
Respondents were asked: ‘‘Is religion an important part of your daily life?’’
Berggren and Bjørnskov computed the share of respondents of an individual
country replying ‘‘yes’’ to this question. The religiosity variable takes on
values between 0 (minimum) and 1 (maximum). Previous studies such as
Halman and Draulans (2006) have confirmed that the answers to the Gallup
World View question are a suitable means by which to measure religiosity.
The data compiled by Berggren and Bjørnskov (2013) are based on polls in
the years 2009–2012. We acknowledge that ideally religiosity measured over
the period 2009–2012 should not be used to explain economic freedom
over the period 2001–2010, but we base our use of the data on religiosity
changing little within a country in the short run. Variation is likely to arise
across countries and not within a country over time. Low-religiosity countries
include Sweden (0.17), China (0.16), and Estonia (0.15). High-religiosity
countries include Egypt (1), Bangladesh (0.99), and Indonesia (0.99), which
are all Muslim-majority. Our full data set includes 137 countries.
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Correlations
To illustrate the association between economic freedom, religion, and reli-
giosity, we first present correlations between the overall economic freedom
index, Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim majorities, and religiosity. Figure 1
shows the correlations, which we previously indicated in our summary of
results. The overall economic freedom index is positively associated with
the Protestant population share (r ¼ .27), negatively with the Muslim pop-
ulation share (r¼.21), and shows almost zero correlation for the Catholic
population share (r ¼ .06). Countries with Protestant majorities and high
economic freedom include, for example, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Estonia. Economic freedom was less present in Muslim-majority countries
such as Niger and Algeria. The correlation coefficient between the overall
economic freedom index and religiosity of .48 indicates that economic
freedom declined with the proportion of religious citizens in the populations.
Countries with low economic freedom and high religiosity include, for exam-
ple, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Economic freedom is high and religiosity is
low, for example, in Hong Kong, Denmark, and Estonia. Table A1 shows the
correlation coefficients.
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Figure 1. Correlations—Overall economic freedom index (averaged over the
period 2001–2010); the share of Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and religiosity.
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The Empirical Model
The basic econometric model has the form:
Economic freedomi ¼ Skakreligionik þ breligiosityi þ Skgkreligionik
 religiosityi þ Sldlcontinentil
þ Smemlegal originim þ Snznxin þ ui;
ð1Þ
with i¼ 1, . . . , 137; k¼ 1, . . . , 3; l¼ 1, . . . , 4;m¼ 1, . . . , 4; and n¼ 1 and 2.
The dependent variable economic freedomi is economic freedom in
country i. Religionik describes the religion variables with distinctions
between Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and others (reference category).
Religiosityi is the religiosity variable. Religionik  religiosityi is
the interaction term between the religion and religiosity variables. We
include the interaction term to test whether religiosity mitigated or
enhanced the association between religion types and economic freedom.
Continentil are continental dummy variables with the value 1 if country i
belongs to continent l and 0 otherwise. We distinguish Africa (reference
category), Asia, Europe, America, and Oceania. Legal originim are legal
origin dummy variables (La Porta et al. 1999). We distinguish five
different legal origins: British (reference category), French, German,
Scandinavian, and socialist.15 We expect economic freedom in countries
with British legal origin to be more pronounced than economic freedom in
countries with French, German, Scandinavian, and socialist legal origin.
Sn zn xin contains the logarithm of per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) and a democracy variable (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
2010). Per capita GDP is the average of the annual data over the period
2001–2010. The democracy variable is the average of the annual data
over the period 2001–2008 because the data from Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland (2010) is only available until 2008. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics of all variables. We estimate the model with ordinary least
squares and standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity (Huber/white/
sandwich standard errors—see Huber 1967; White 1980).
Results
Baseline Results
Table 2 shows the regression results. Columns 1 and 2 corroborate the
simple correlations between the types of religion variables, religiosity, and
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economic freedom. Column 3 shows results when the types of religion and
the religiosity variable are included. Column 4 also includes the interaction
terms between the types of religion variables and the religiosity variable.
We discuss marginal effects below. Columns 5–12 indicate that including/
excluding individual control variables does not change the inferences
regarding the types of religion variables.
The control variables display the expected signs and are statistically
significant in several cases. The democracy variable, for example, has the
expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in
columns 5 and 6, 5 percent level in column 7, 10 percent level in column 9,
and just slightly lacks statistical significance at the 10 percent level in
column 12. Economic freedom was about 0.3 to 0.7 points higher in democ-
racies as compared to autocracies.
The Asian continent dummy variable is statistically significant at the 1
percent level in column 10 and 10 percent level in column 12, indicating that
the overall economic freedom index was about 0.34 points higher in Asian
countries compared to African countries. The Oceania continent dummy vari-
able is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in column 10 and at the 10
percent level in column 12 indicating that the overall economic freedom index
was about 0.57 points higher in countries in Oceania compared to African
countries. The continent dummy variables for European and American coun-
tries have a positive sign and are statistically significant in column 10 but lack
statistical significance in column 12. The coefficients of the Scandinavian
legal origin variable are statistically significant at the 10 percent level in
column 8, at the 5 percent level in column 9 and at the 1 percent level in
column 10, and indicate that the economic freedom index was about 0.54 to
0.67 points lower in countries with a Scandinavian legacy compared to coun-
tries with a British legal origin. This finding reflects Scandinavian countries
having a large size and scope of government. Log per capita income is sta-
tistically significant at the 1 percent level in columns 11 and 12 and has the
expected positive sign. The numericalmeaning of the coefficient in column 12
is that the overall economic freedom indexwas by 0.0041 points higher than in
an otherwise identical country that had a 1 percent larger per capita income.
The marginal effects of the religion variables are interpreted conditionally
on the interaction with the religiosity variable. Figures 2–4 show marginal
effects of the Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim population share variable as
compared to the ‘‘other’’ category of religions evaluated at different levels of
religiosity (referring to the regression in column 12). The marginal effects
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level when the 95 percent confi-
dence interval does not include the zero line. Figure 2 shows that the Catholic
258 Public Finance Review 46(2)
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of the Catholics share as compared to other religions.
Conditioned on religiosity. Effects refer to column 2 of table 2—Overall economic
freedom index.
Figure 3. Marginal effect of the Protestants share as compared to other religions.
Conditioned on religiosity. Effects refer to column 2 of table 2—Overall economic
freedom index.
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share does not turn out to be statistically significant evaluated at any level of
religiosity. Figure 4 shows that the Muslim share has a negative sign but does
not turn out to be statistically significant evaluated at any level of religiosity.
Consequently, when we control for the explanatory variables per capita GDP
and political institutions, there is no evidence to conclude that Muslim-
majority countries have less economic freedom than countries with other
religious majorities.
By contrast, there are significant marginal effects describing differences in
Protestant influence in religious and nonreligious countries (figure 3). Coun-
tries with Protestant majorities had significantly greater economic freedom
than countries with other religious majorities when the religiosity variable has
values smaller than 0.7 (on a scale from 0 to 1 for pure nonreligious and pure
religious countries). In pure nonreligious countries, for example, the eco-
nomic freedom index was by about 0.013 points lower than in an otherwise
identical country having a 1-percentage point larger share of Protestants,
implying that the economic freedom index in a nonreligious country with
no Protestants was 1.3 points lower than in an otherwise identical but purely
Protestant nonreligious country. This marginal effect is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level. Themarginal effect of the Protestant share variable
Figure 4. Marginal effect of the Muslim share as compared to other religions.
Conditioned on religiosity. Effects refer to column 2 of table 2—Overall economic
freedom index.
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evaluated for pure religious countries does, however, not turn out to be
statistically significant, indicating that Protestantism did not result in greater
economic freedom in religious (high religiosity) countries.
Robustness Tests
We tested whether our results are robust in several ways. Religious fractio-
nalization may predict economic freedom, and the effects of the types of
religion variables may, as well, depend on religious fractionalization. For
religious fractionalization, we use the variable of Alesina et al. (2003). The
religious fractionalization variable takes on values between 0 (minimum)
and 1 (maximum). Countries with low religious fractionalization include
Algeria (0.0091), Turkey (0.0049), and Yemen (0.0023). Countries with
high religious fractionalization include Australia (0.8211), South Africa
(0.8603), and the United States (0.8241).
Table 3 shows the results when the religious fractionalization variable is
included and interacted with the types of religion. Religious fractionaliza-
tion does not turn out to be statistically significant. Countries with Protes-
tant majorities enjoyed economic freedom when religious fractionalization
was low.
We replaced the ‘‘types of religion’’ variables measuring the share of
population adhering to an individual religion by dummy variables taking the
value 1 when the predominant religion share was 60 percent or larger. Infer-
ences do not change. In countries with Protestant majorities and hardly any
religiosity, theEFWindexwas about 0.98points higher than in other countries.
Democracies and Dictatorships
Previous studies have shown that the presence of economic freedom is
influenced by political institutions. The effects of religion and religiosity
on economic freedom may well differ in democracies and autocracies. We
therefore split the sample into democracies and autocracies by using the
measure of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Because the measure for
political institutions is binary and we take averages of economic freedom
over the period 2001–2010, we arrive at 81 pure democracies, 10 transition
countries, and 46 pure dictatorships when splitting our sample of 137 coun-
tries. The EFW index is 7.04 in democracies and 6.35 in dictatorships.
The results show that the effect of Protestantism on economic freedom is
strong in democracies. The marginal effect of Protestantism is statistically
significant for values of the religiosity variable between 0 and 0.9. This
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Table 3. Regression Results: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors
(Dependent Variable: Overall Economic Freedom Index).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Catholics
(share)
0.000546
(0.24)
0.00450
(0.93)
0.00163
(0.35)
0.00243
(0.56)
Protestants
(share)
0.00956***
(3.53)
0.00939**
(2.05)
0.0348**
(2.50)
0.0278**
(2.54)
Muslims
(share)
0.00475*
(1.88)
0.00622*
(1.93)
0.00229
(0.55)
0.00123
(0.32)
Religious
fractional
0.0841
(0.25)
0.550*
(1.67)
0.451
(0.64)
0.440
(0.57)
0.0825
(0.13)
Catholics
(share) 
religious
fractional
0.0151
(1.02)
0.00211
(0.18)
0.00560
(0.49)
Protestants
(share) 
religious
fractional
0.00419
(0.27)
0.0463*
(1.74)
0.0355*
(1.74)
Muslims
(share) 
religious
fractional
0.00790
(0.66)
0.00516
(0.45)
0.00303
(0.31)
Asia 1.010***
(5.15)
0.329*
(1.69)
Europe 1.380***
(6.99)
0.134
(0.47)
Americas 0.946***
(4.27)
0.197
(0.88)
Oceania 2.085***
(6.91)
0.820**
(2.35)
French legal
origin
0.355*
(1.90)
0.233
(1.52)
Socialist legal
origin
0.633***
(3.07)
0.211
(1.08)
German legal
origin
0.241
(1.02)
0.0243
(0.13)
Scandinavian
legal origin
1.847**
(2.53)
1.700***
(2.96)
Log per capita
GDP
0.381***
(5.46)
(continued)
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interval for the religiosity variable is much larger than the interval in the full
sample. The marginal effects of the Catholics and Muslim variables do not
turn out to be statistically significant. In dictatorships, the religion variables
do not turn out to be statistically significant.
Conclusions
There has been no prior study of the relation between religion and economic
freedom, even though a relation is suggested by Weber’s Protestant ethic
and in studies by Timur Kuran and others of economic incentives under
Islam. Our results add to the literature on the influence of religion on
economic behavior and phenomena.16 Our primary conclusion is that the
persistent significance of Protestant populations is an indicator of the pres-
ence of economic freedom. Weber’s Protestant ethic is supported, even
though religiosity in Protestant populations, particularly outside of the
United States, tends to be low. Our results substantiate that cultural trans-
mission results in retention of values when past beliefs and circumstances
that gave rise to the values are no longer present.
Because economic freedom is a requisite of economic progress, our
results imply that the religious composition of a population and religiosity
can affect economic development and incomes. The religious composition
of a population and religiosity in general change only slowly through dif-
ferential fertility in different religious groups. Large-scale migration can,
however, result in abrupt change in religious composition and religiosity
among a country’s population. Our results suggest that religion and religi-
osity of immigrants can have consequences for economic freedom.
Table 3. (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.242*
(1.73)
Constant 6.777***
(47.89)
6.972***
(32.73)
6.908***
(28.87)
5.893***
(16.59)
3.253***
(5.61)
Observations 137 137 137 137 137
R2 .0005 .110 .131 .493 .627
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. GDP ¼ gross domestic product.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Notes
1. Economic freedom results in higher incomes and greater economic growth
(Compton, Giedeman, and Hoover 2011; De Haan and Sturm 2000; De Haan,
Lundstro¨m, and Sturm 2006; Pitlik 2002; Rode and Gwartney 2012; Rode and
Coll 2012). Workers benefit through a higher share of national income (Young
and Lawson 2014). Benefits have also been reported through increased toler-
ance (Berggren and Nilsson 2013), greater trust or social capital (Berggren and
Jordahl 2006), lower unemployment (Feldmann 2007), policies against human
trafficking (Heller et al. 2016), and feelings of ‘‘life satisfaction,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’
Table A1. Correlations—Overall Economic Freedom Index (Averaged over the
Period 2001–2010) and the Share of Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Religiosity, and
Religious Fractionalization (137 Observations).
Overall
economic
freedom
Catholics
(share)
Protestants
(share)
Muslims
(share) Religiosity
Religious
fraction-
alization
Overall economic
freedom
1.00
Catholics (share) .06 1.00
Protestants
(share)
.27 .15 1.00
Muslims (share) .21 .49 .33 1.00
Religiosity .48 .00 .37 .37 1.00
Religious
fractionalization
.02 .16 .27 .31 .08 1.00
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and ‘‘perceived life control’’ (Gehring 2013; Knoll, Pitlik, and Rode 2013a,
2013b; Rode 2013; Pitlik and Rode 2014). Studies have also combined eco-
nomic freedom with other influences: Williamson and Mathers (2011) find that
aspects of culture can substitute for absent economic freedom. Berggren
(2003) and Hall and Lawson (2014), in overviews, associate the beneficial
effects of economic freedom with protection of property rights, unencum-
bered domestic and foreign trade, access to credit and productive inputs, and
people retaining their incomes for personal spending. Berggren and Nilsson
(2016) use data on the individual states of the United States to study how
economic freedom affects tolerance for different groups and types of
behavior.
2. On exceptions, particularly in East Asia, see Paldam (2003). See Bjørnskov and
Potrafke (2012, 2013) and Potrafke (2013a) on government ideology and eco-
nomic freedom.
3. On disincentives of authoritarian rulers and elites to allow economic freedom,
see Hillman (2007a). Economic freedom has also been found to be negatively
associated with foreign aid, which is usually received by autocratic govern-
ments (Young and Sheehan 2014), and negatively associated with linguistic and
ethnic fractionalization (Heckelman and Wilson 2017), which tends to result in
autocracy (see the literature cited in Hillman, Metsuyanim, and Potrafke 2015).
Rode and Revuelta (2015) conclude that populistic governments also diminish
economic freedom. Reforms toward more economic freedom are more likely in
democracies (Pitlik 2008).
4. The Jewish scholar Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon, also known as Moses Maimo-
nides (1135–1204 CE) and by the acronym the Rambam, distinguished eight
degrees of charity according to whether there is anonymity and whether giving
is sincere, with the highest degree of charity being that which makes the recipient
self-sufficient. Anonymity is regarded as virtuous in Islam: Lambarraa and Riener
(2012) report experimental evidence from Muslim Morocco showing that anon-
ymity increased the incidence of giving (from 59 percent to 77 percent) and
among students at religious schools increased the average amount given (from
8.90 to 13.00 in local currency). Evidence from experiments in Christian societies
shows that people tend to give more when their giving is observed by others (see
Soetevent 2005, on church giving, although, in repetitions of the experiments, the
effect of visible giving diminished but larger coins were used in donations).
5. van Winden (2007) provides an overview of the effect of emotions on behavior
and public policy.
6. The inhibitions to economic growth due to the nature of the rule of law under
Islam have been described by Facchini (2010), Gouda (2013), and Gutmann and
Voigt (2015).
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7. Throughout European history, Christian borrowers often relied on Jewish bank-
ers for credit. The role of Jews as lenders often contributed to prejudice against
Jews (Carlton 1995; Hillman 2013). Jews were regarded as ‘‘unproductive’’ in
earning income through interest. Jews took upon themselves the risk of provid-
ing credit that facilitated farmers’ receiving payment for crops that had not yet
been harvested and for which the future market price was unknown (Aronson
1990).
8. Islamic law or Sharia requires technical and definitional devices to circumvent
the interest prohibition (see Siddiqi 1983). Depending on location, banking in
Muslim-majority countries need not, however, be significantly different from
banking in western societies (see, e.g., Chong and Liu 2009).
9. On Protestantism and female literacy, see Becker and Woessmann (2008,
2009). Discrimination against women in Muslim-majority countries has been
documented in numerous studies (see Donno and Russett 2004; Norton and
Tomal 2009; Cooray and Potrafke 2011; Kilby and Scholz 2011; Cooray
2012; Potrafke and Ursprung 2012; Cho 2013; Cooray and Klasen 2014; Gut-
mann and Voigt 2015; Salahodjaev and Azam 2015; Potrafke 2016). Discrim-
ination against women is more pronounced when Islam is the source of
legislation (Gouda and Potrafke 2016).
10. In a comprehensive empirical study, McCleary and Barro (2006) found that
Islam among religions is most discouraging of economic growth.
11. See Fish (2002), Karatnycky (2002), Voigt (2005), Borooah and Paldam (2007),
Rowley and Smith (2009), and Potrafke (2012, 2013b). For an exception, see
Hillman, Metsuyanim, and Potrafke (2015), who studied elections in Muslim-
majority local-government constituencies in Israel. Voter turnout in Muslim-
majority municipalities in many cases approached 100 percent against a back-
ground of decisiveness in voting by extended families in local elections.
12. Buchanan (2005) describes the need for dependence to satisfy individual feel-
ings of insecurity and describes how in some secular societies the state has taken
the place assigned to religious belief in previous times.
13. For example, for evidence on sustained prevalence of prejudice against Jews in
some European regions over centuries, see Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012). For a
model describing intergenerational transmission of preferences, see Bisin and
Verdier (2000).
14. Paldam (2015) has described restrictions on economic freedom in the Scandi-
navian welfare state through the successful rent seeking of a majority ‘‘welfare
coalition’’ that benefits from spending and taxation policies.
15. Legal origin does not predict convergence in economic freedom (as measured as
the difference in the Economic Freedom of the World indices in the years 2010
and 1980—see Hall 2016). Economic freedom at the state level in the United
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States is lower in states with a civil legal law tradition than in states with
common legal law tradition (Nattinger and Hall 2012).
16. On economics and religion, see Iannaccone (1998) and more recently Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2003); Barro and McCleary (2005); Helble (2007);
Berggren and Bjørnskov (2013); and Chadi and Krapf (2015). Schneider, Lins-
bauer, and Heinemann (2015) showed that countries with Protestant majorities
have smaller shadow economies. Becker et al. (2015) studied discrimination in
voting behavior involving Israel in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly
and found that only three Protestant-majority non-European countries consis-
tently do not join in decoy voting to criticize Israel. The decoy voting distracts
attention in the UN voting agenda from human rights violations of authoritarian
governments.
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